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7~61-C

[So F. No. 17439. In Bank. May 27, 1947.]

GLENN H. SPENCER, Appellant, V. TED NELSON et aI.•
Respondents.
[1] Appeal-Right of Review-Persons Entitled. - A party who

is granted a new trial on only one of several issues has a right
to appeal from the order where he is aggrieved by the limitation of the new trial to a single issue which, he asserts, is
not severable from the other issues. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 938,
965.)
[2] Id.-Judgments and Orders Appealable - Effect of Grant of
New Trial.-When an appeal is taken from an order granting
a new trial, the judgment remains effective for the purpose
of an appeal from the judgment.
[3] Id.-Dismissal-Judgment Appealed From.-An appeal from
a judgment against the plaintiff will be dismissed where he
has also appealed from the order granting a limited new
[1] See 2 Cal.Jur. 215; 2 Am.Jur. 943.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 90; [2] Appeal
and Error, § 33; [3] Appeal and Error, § 915.
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trial and seeks an order in general form, and where the decision on appeal, whether for appellant or respondent, will
BUStain the order in one form or another and vacate the judge

,ment.

from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County from an order granting a new trial. Leon
Judge. Appeal from judgment dismissed; motion
4i,eIJD.iJBS appeal from order denied.
R. Agee and Harold C. Holmes, Jr., for Appellant.
:H. Muldary and Norman Elkington for Respondents.

YNOR, J.-Defendants and respondents have filed
to dismiss two appeals, both taken by plaintiff and
from an order granting a new trial and from

)

)

was brought for declaratory relief to ascertain
and effect of a written agreement. After trial
court, judgment was entered in favor of defendants,
!!'!-'-AJ...= ....e. that the instrument was invalid. Plaintiff sought
this adverse judgment both by motion for new
by appeal, &.<! hereinafter appears.
''PI''' ... ,tHF'" motion for new trial was in the usual form,
of the grounds set forth was that the trial court
to make a finding on the material issue of ratification.
court's ruling was that "plaintiff's motion for a
be and the same is hereby granted on the issue
~tllDc:a.tliOn." Eight days later, on stipulation of counsel,
the order but added the words "that the judgentered is vacated."
first appeal is from the order granting a new
It was taken on the theory that the issues of the
not severable, that he was seriously prejudiced by
liIItits.tio,n of the new trial to the single issue of ratiand that the only proper order would be one granttrial on all of the issues. Thus, his sole grievance,
primary reason for this appeal, is the limited form
court's order; and, by the appeal, he asserts that
, court abused its discretion in making the limited
and seeks a reyersal thereof with directions to grant
unlimited new trial.
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Plaintiff's appeal from the judgment is subsidiary and
purely precautionary. It was filed to take care of the situation that might arise (1) if the court's order were beld to
be in substance a denial of a new trial rather than a granting thereof (in which case it would be nonappealable);
or (2) if it were held that the plaintiff was not aggrieved
by the granting of his own motion for a new trial. A serio
ous problem of timeliness is raised in connection with the
appeal from tl!.e judgment, but it is irrelevant in view of
the holding we now make as to the propriety of the appeal
from the order granting a new trial.
[1] The basic contention of appellant is that he cannot
have genuine relief from the adverse judgment by a new
trial limited to a single issue, which, he asserts, is not sever.
able from other issues; and that, in view of the pleadings
and evidence, it can be shown that the trial court abused its
discretion in making the order in the form it did. Thus ap.
pellant has established the two conditions for his appeal:
(1) the order granting a new trial is appealable (Code Civ.
Proc., § 963); and (2) appellant was aggrieved by the order.
The circumstance that this case is unusual in its facts, in
that normally the party against whom the new trial is granted
is the one who appeals, is immaterial; any party aggrieved
by an appealable order has a right to appeal therefrom, even
though the order is in form apparently favorable to him.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 938; Mountain Tunnel G. M. Co. v.
Bryan, 111 Cal. 36 [43 P. 410]; Quint v. McMullen, 103
Cal. 381, 383 [37 P. 381].)
[2] As to the appeal from the judgment: One effect of
an order granting a new trial is, of course, to vacate the
judgment; however, when an appeal is taken from such an
order the vacating effect is suspended, and the judgment
remains effective for the purpose of an appeal from the judg.
ment. (Jackson v. Dolan, 202 Cal. 468 [261 P. 7061; Puckhaber v. Henry, 147 Cal. 424 [81 P. 1105].) [3] In the
normal situation, the appeal from the order granting a new
trial is filed by the party successful at the trial. and a crossappeal from the judgment is filed by the party unsuccessful at
the trial to protect himself in the event that the order granting him a new trial is reversed. (See Rules on Appeal, rule
3(a) (2).) Here the situation is different, for plaintitI has
filed both the appeals, and defendants, the successful parties
at the trial, are satisfied with the order granting the limited
new trial and not onl¥ have not appealed therefrom but are
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seeking to dismiss plaintifr'8 appeal therefrom. In
with neither party opposing the granting of
trial, one seeking it in general form, the other in
form, it is plain that the decision on this appeal
· to sustain the order granting a new trial in one form
This being so. the judgment will inevitably be
the ordinary provisional effect of such vaeafrom the order grl1nting new trial may
The appeal frcm such vacated judgment
the,refore be properly dismissed.
· motion to dismiss the appeal from the order grantnew trial is denied, and the motion to dismiss the
· from the judgment is granted.

IIUlUl".Ull,

C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
Spence, J., concurred.
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